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Abstract
Chen Boda's four cleanups model in Xiaozhan, a marshy area southeast of Tian-
jin, was as important as Wang Guangmei's Taoyuan brigade in 1964, but is less 
well known. As Chairman Mao's top theorist and the editor of Red Flag, Chen 
Boda enjoyed support from Mao and Liu Shaoqi as he uncovered evidence of 
'revisionism' in Tianjin's south suburbs. Chen's claims led to a witch-hunt that 
killed tens of people and tortured and imprisoned many others. Beyond Tianjin, 
the 'Xiaozhan experience' was promoted as a successful 'power seizure' in a cen-
tral document circulated nationwide in October 1964. The document pushed the 
socialist education movement in a more radical direction, causing the downfall 
of rural cadres across China. This article draws upon archival sources, memoirs, 
and interviews to detail Chen Boda's contentious interactions with Tianjin ofﬁ-
cials and suburban villagers. Chen allowed the four cleanups to turn brutal in Xi-
aozhan, and his vision of a rural China dominated by class enemies differed from 
what work team members experienced. Ironically, in order to keep the Xiaozhan 
experience from falling apart, Chen had to resort to methods similar to those used 
by the village cadres he had recently overthrown. Chen Boda's meddling in Xi-
aozhan reveals considerable diversity—and indeed, confusion—in how top lead-
ers interpreted and carried out Mao's shifting plans for the countryside during 
the four cleanups. This confusion led to disastrous outcomes for rural residents.
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On an inspection visit to suburban villages outside of Tianjin in 1960, 
top party theorist Chen Boda approached a group of peasants. Eager to 
make conversation, the editor of Red Flag greeted them: 'Are you ﬁshing'? 
The anglers responded in the afﬁrmative, but demurred when Chen, 
ever alert to signs of illicit market activity, asked if they planned to sell 
the ﬁsh. 'It seemed that they did not want to pay attention to us', Chen 
recalled as he recounted the story four years later (Chen Boda 1964: 39-
40).1 But after Chen asked about local crops, the group warmed to him 
and chatted as they walked toward Tuozidi, a village of 500 people. Chen 
was in Xiaozhan, a marshy area between Tianjin and the Bohai gulf. 
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The most well-known person from Tuozidi was Jiang Deyu, a rice 
specialist and national labour model who had visited the Soviet Union 
and met with Chairman Mao Zedong. But when the peasants brought 
up 'labour model Jiang', Chen Boda had no idea who they were talking 
about. One local jumped at the opportunity to complain to a top party 
leader. 'Are we not supposed to emphasize class struggle now? We think 
that labour model Jiang is a landlord, or at least a rich peasant', Chen 
recalled the peasants telling him. 'He has cheated our Xiaozhan'.
Chen asked his Tianjin colleagues to investigate Jiang, who was qui-
etly stripped of his honours and kicked out of the party in 1962. Chen 
was impressed with his seemingly successful foray into rural work. 'Why 
was it that I went for only two hours and I learned about the matter, 
but many local comrades had been there for more than ten years and 
did not know about it? Why were the masses willing to tell me this, but 
not willing to tell others'? The key, Chen reckoned, was his attitude. 
'The masses check you out and see if they can bare their heart to you', 
he said. 'I am a very stupid person, and have very little experience in 
working with the masses, but no matter how bad you are, as long as 
your attitude is correct, you can quickly discover problems'. 
Chen's positive experience in suburban Tianjin led him to return to 
Xiaozhan in March 1964 during the four cleanups campaign, much to 
the regret of local cadres. Chen quickly discovered other problems. He 
charged that class enemies had not only hidden their true identities, they 
had usurped village leadership and enjoyed protection from higher-ups. 
Chen's claims led to a witch-hunt that implicated thousands of villag-
ers, killed tens of people, and tortured and imprisoned many others 
in Tianjin's south suburbs. Beyond Tianjin, the 'Xiaozhan experience' 
was promoted as a successful 'power seizure' in a central document 
circulated nationwide in October 1964. Bo Yibo, who was vice premier 
at the time, recalled that the report on the Xiaozhan experience was 
responsible for pushing the socialist education movement in a more 
radical direction, causing the downfall of many rural cadres across 
China (Bo 1993, Vol. 2: 1123-24).
Chen Boda's misreading of rural reality was disastrous for people 
in Xiaozhan. He went there looking for evidence of class struggle, and 
he found it right away. Yet he failed to appreciate the pressures on 
rural cadres to bend rules in order to help their villages survive, let 
alone prosper. By the time Chen ﬁgured out how villages really got by 
under the collective economy, he was forced to break the rules himself 
in order to keep the 'Xiaozhan experience' from falling apart. But for 
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many residents of Tianjin's south suburbs, the damage had already 
been done.
Chen Boda's adventures in Xiaozhan were carried out with the ap-
proval of both Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi. In June 1964, Mao men-
tioned Xiaozhan as evidence that revisionism had already appeared in 
China (Bo 1993, Vol. 2: 1116). When Chen supervised the drafting of 
the nationally circulated report on Xiaozhan, he claimed that he was 
acting on Mao's orders (Quan 1993: 91). And Liu Shaoqi penned party 
centre's introductory directive about the report when it was ﬁnally is-
sued in late October (Bo 1993, Vol. 2: 1122).2 At the time, the Xiaozhan 
four cleanups model was as important as Wang Guangmei's famous 
Taoyuan brigade.
Xiaozhan is barely mentioned in western scholarship on the socialist 
education movement. Limited sources have required most studies to rely 
on Cultural Revolution era documents that vilify the 'false four cleanups' 
in Taoyuan but keep mum on Xiaozhan. Richard Baum's classic work 
devotes an entire chapter to Taoyuan but does not mention Xiaozhan 
(Baum 1975). More recent works refer to Xiaozhan and Chen Boda, but 
only brieﬂy (MacFarquhar 1997; Friedman, Pickowicz and Selden 2005). 
Why the silence? Liu Shaoqi and his wife Wang Guangmei were under 
attack in 1967, while Chen Boda was doing the attacking. Chen's four 
cleanups model, like Taoyuan, had been cast aside after Mao criticized 
the 'human wave tactic' of sending huge work teams to villages at the 
end of 1964. But unlike Liu Shaoqi, 'Chen refocused his loyalties back to 
Mao just in time' after Mao issued the moderating 'twenty-three points' 
in January 1965 (MacFarquhar 1997: 426). Chen Boda's meddling in 
Xiaozhan reveals considerable diversity—and indeed, confusion—in 
how top leaders interpreted and carried out Mao's shifting plans for the 
countryside during the four cleanups. In Xiaozhan and elsewhere, this 
confusion led to disastrous outcomes for many villagers.
At ﬁrst glance, Chen Boda's Xiaozhan model looks quite similar to the 
'Taoyuan experience' sponsored by Wang Guangmei and Liu Shaoqi. 
The four cleanups in Xiaozhan and Taoyuan featured large outside 
work teams that attacked ofﬁcial graft and corruption, squelched illicit 
market activity, and overthrew village leaders en masse. Violent inter-
rogation methods and struggle sessions were common in each locale. 
Chen and Wang both diverted substantial sums from state coffers for 
infrastructure development and fresh paint in their respective models 
(Baum 1975: 89). Yet there were signiﬁcant differences between the 
Xiaozhan and Taoyuan experiences. These differences help to explain 
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why Chen Boda's risky adventure in Xiaozhan did not land him in the 
same political hot water that burned Wang Guangmei and Liu Shaoqi 
after their Taoyuan intervention.
Chen's aggressive focus on the danger posed by rural class enemies 
in positions of power distinguished the four cleanups movement in 
Xiaozhan. Mao Zedong's wishes for the four cleanups evolved over 
time and were often unclear. Luckily for Chen Boda, his constant refer-
ral to class struggle and capitalist restoration ended up being closer to 
what the chairman wanted than Liu and Wang's more exclusive focus 
on rural corruption. Also, unlike Wang Guangmei in Taoyuan, Chen 
did not wear a disguise, travel incognito, or hide his intentions. Ever 
since his ﬁrst visit to Xiaozhan, Chen had been loud and clear about the 
need to battle against counter revolutionaries and to 'seize power' from 
suspect rural cadres. This aspect of Chen's four cleanups—and not the 
huge outside work teams and broad scope of attack that Chen and Wang 
Guangmei shared—is what Mao remembered about Xiaozhan, helping 
Chen to avoid major political damage in late 1964 and early 1965.3 The 
people of Xiaozhan were not as fortunate.
Chen Boda Gets his Feet Muddy
Xiaozhan, like much of the area southeast of Tianjin, used to be under-
water. After the sea retreated, reedy marshland was gradually populated 
by migrants from north China. Many villages did not appear on the map 
until two developments during the late Qing dynasty: ﬁrst, the discovery 
that the wetlands were perfect for paddy rice cultivation; and second, 
the establishment of Yuan Shikai's Beiyang military training camp (Xie 
2004: 15). After the army's arrival, Xiaozhan township, 30 kilometres 
from Tianjin's city centre, developed quickly, and by 1964 had a popula-
tion of 11,000. Its proximity to urban Tianjin oriented the region's rice, 
vegetables, and handicrafts, primarily woven reed products, toward 
the city. When Chen Boda visited Xiaozhan, the area's political and 
economic fortunes were still closely tied to Tianjin.
The four cleanups in Tianjin's outskirts began with little hint of the 
turmoil to come. In January 1964, the Tianjin municipal government 
established test points in the south suburbs: one in Xiaozhan com-
mune (headquartered in the township and in charge of surrounding 
villages), and another in Beizhakou commune, ﬁve kilometres north-
west of Xiaozhan township. The work teams sent to the south suburbs 
included city and suburban cadres and recent university graduates. 
Their initial ﬁndings, reported in March 1964, were unremarkable. The 
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class composition of the area was complicated, owing to the motley 
mix of migrants who had settled its villages over the past 70-80 years. 
Land reform in 1951 and a reassessment in 1954 had been mild, which 
allowed class enemies to falsely claim poor peasant status. Some of them 
had even wormed their way into leadership positions. But the overall 
achievements of the region were noteworthy, most cadres were good, 
and those who had committed mistakes were to be treated leniently (Xie 
2004: 16; Liu 2000: 220). At this point, it appeared that Xiaozhan's four 
cleanups would be 'brief and uneventful', much like in Hebei's Raoyang 
county, where rural leaders used the movement to reward friends with 
politically valuable 'poor peasant' class labels and punish rivals with 
damning 'rich peasant' and 'landlord' labels (Friedman, Pickowicz and 
Selden 2005: 54, 61).
The ﬁrst sign that Xiaozhan's four cleanups were special was the 
appearance of Zhou Yang, deputy director of the central propaganda 
department. Zhou went to the Tianjin region in late February to in-
terview sent-down youth, but thanks to a few words from Chairman 
Mao, Zhou changed his itinerary. Mao, who was upset that writers and 
artists were not serving workers and peasants, ordered Zhou to spend 
time at the grassroots. 'If he is unwilling to go, then order the army to 
force him to go down', Mao told Chen Boda. Ostensibly out of concern 
for Zhou Yang's health, Chen and Tianjin ofﬁcials arranged for Zhou to 
stay somewhere close to the city. They settled on Xiyouying, a village 
of 1,100 people in Beizhakou commune (Chen 2005: 248).
Zhou stayed in the nicest home in Xiyouying, which belonged to fe-
male party secretary and labour model Zhang Fengqin and her husband 
Yu Zhanhai, who was also a local cadre. Zhou did not reveal his ofﬁcial 
position, saying he was merely a writer hoping to 'experience life' (Wang 
Kangzhi jinian wenji bianjizu 2001: 124). But village life confused Zhou 
Yang. Some villagers criticized Zhou's host, who had been featured just 
weeks earlier in a Tianjin Daily proﬁle about her honest words and deeds 
(Tianjin ribao, 2 February 1964). When Tianjin propaganda chief Wang 
Kangzhi visited Zhou to see how he was doing, Zhou said, 'The more 
I learn about problems here, the more complicated they get. I am like a 
doctor who can only inquire about a patient's condition but cannot write 
a prescription' (Wang Kangzhi jinian wenji bianjizu 2001: 124).
Enter Chen Boda, who would not hesitate to issue prescriptions. 
Chen's quick discovery of labour model Jiang Deyu's problems, com-
bined with his awareness of Mao's concerns about revisionism and class 
struggle, encouraged him to take charge of Xiaozhan's four cleanups. 
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The movement was meant to ﬁx rural maladies that had spun out of 
control during and after the Great Leap famine, such as corrupt village 
cadres who wined and dined at state expense, or who underreported 
harvest numbers in order to reduce the amount of grain requisitioned 
by the state. Black market trading, proﬁt-making rural sidelines, and 
private agricultural plots were also dangerous signs that China's coun-
tryside had already turned revisionist. There was also the trumped-up 
fear that class enemies who had avoided detection during land reform 
were in positions of power, continuing to exploit poor peasants. In a 
conversation with Tianjin mayor Hu Zhaoheng, Chen Boda explained 
why these problems were so common: 'Putting together a whole socialist 
system is not easy. Even after many decades, the systems established 
by past dynasties were not perfect, much less so this new system that 
is eliminating exploitation' (Quan 1993: 92). Chen was suggesting that 
his goal in Xiaozhan was to move toward eradicating exploitation in 
China's villages. In order to do so, he had to target the wealthiest, most 
powerful villagers he could ﬁnd.
In March 1964, Chen Boda dropped in on Tianjin ﬁrst party secretary 
Wan Xiaotang before heading to Xiaozhan.4 On at least three previous 
occasions, Wan and Chen had clashed when Chen passed through 
Tianjin. In summer 1961, Chen told Tianjin ofﬁcials in charge of eco-
nomic planning that Tianjin was his 'second hometown' and that he 
would come every year. But Chen's visits never turned out the way he 
wanted. Wan Xiaotang repeatedly shelved Chen's suggestions on how 
to improve Tianjin's industrial development, calling Chen's ideas 'di-
vorced from reality', and privately grumbling that the vaunted theorist's 
'ideology was lacking' (Li 1998: 201-2, 204; Xie 2004: 21). Chen, feeling 
snubbed, said that 'this Wan Xiaotang is no good', and complained, 
'Tianjin does not obey me, I will not go there anymore' (Xie 2004: 21; 
Wan Xiaotang jinian wenji bianjizu 2001: 408). But in 1964, Chen could 
not stay away. Having failed to inﬂuence Tianjin's urban industry, he 
turned his attention to its rural hinterland. Chen listened quietly as Wan 
Xiaotang reported on the excellent economic performance of Tianjin's 
south suburbs. Wan assured Chen that Liu Jinfeng, ﬁrst party secretary 
of the south suburbs, was a 'good comrade' and that there were several 
enthusiastic labour models in the Xiaozhan area (Xie 2004: 19).
Liu Jinfeng, who had served as suburban party secretary since 1953, 
accompanied Chen to Xiyouying. As their car neared the village, Chen 
ordered the driver to stop. He stepped out of the car, looked around, 
and began speaking quickly. Liu found Chen's Fujianese accent incom-
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prehensible, but ﬁnally understood that Chen wanted to walk the ﬁnal 
half kilometre to the village. Chen was saying that entering the village 
in a car would distance them from the masses. After hearing a report 
from the four cleanups work team stationed in Xiyouying, Chen visited 
Zhang Fengqin's house, where Zhou Yang was staying. Chen took note 
of the three new outbuildings in Zhang's compound, saw hefty bags of 
rice stacked up inside, and ﬁxated on something he had never seen in 
villages before: double-glazed glass windows. After twenty minutes, 
Chen had seen enough. He told Zhou Yang to move to a poor peasant's 
house, where Zhou would stay until returning to Beijing in May. Chen 
then went to report his ﬁndings to the work team. 'Zhang Fengqin does 
not seem like a poor peasant, her family is richer than all other villagers. 
She got rich after becoming party secretary', Chen said. 'The double-
glazed glass exposed Zhang Fengqin. She is a poor peasant who is not 
really poor, a labour model who does not labour, she has become a 
politicized ﬁgure'. Something had to be done, Chen told the work team. 
'You can tell with just one look that she is the enemy. You take care of 
this, we cannot have mistakes here,' he ordered (Liu 2000: 204-5; Wang 
2004: 207). When he returned to Tianjin, he told city ofﬁcials that Zhang 
should be removed from her leadership positions.
The work team jumped into action and quickly assembled evidence 
of Zhang's crimes, which included illegally proﬁting from seven village 
factories established during the early 1960s, lowballing harvest reports 
and keeping excess grain for the village, and hiding her true class iden-
tity as a rich peasant (Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao dangshi jiaoyan 
er shi 1987, Vol. 5: 488-89). This verdict came as a shock to Liu Jinfeng, 
who had spent years promoting Zhang Fengqin as a star female village 
leader. Zhang had organized Xiyouying's ﬁrst mutual aid society and 
its ﬁrst cooperative in the 1950s. Now she was being attacked because 
her house did not conform to what Chen Boda thought a village cadre's 
home should look like. Liu saw Xiyouying's wealth not as a crime, but 
as evidence of his successful stewardship of the suburbs. 'According to 
[Chen Boda's] logic, poor peasants had to be utterly penniless forever', 
Liu wrote (Liu 2000: 213). 
The actual situation was more complicated than Liu Jinfeng suggests. 
Chen Boda was indeed disturbed by what he saw as excessive wealth 
in the countryside (during a 1960 visit to a village in Wuqing county, 
between Beijing and Tianjin, Chen visited a large family compound, saw 
a towering pile of thick quilts on the kang, and 'felt it was very strange'; 
Chen 1964: 39). But factional disputes and political manoeuvring also 
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came into play. By targeting Zhang Fengqin, Chen Boda took pressure 
off of her main rival, deputy village party secretary Wu Fengchun. Wu 
had been complaining about Zhang's false harvest reports for several 
years. The four cleanups work team in Xiyouying, well aware that 
Zhang had been praised in Tianjin Daily and was favoured by subur-
ban and municipal leaders, already had a 7,000 character document 
denouncing her potential usurper Wu (Tianjin ribao, 18 August 1970). 
Chen Boda's comments about Zhang shifted the movement's direc-
tion and introduced the purported threat of hidden class enemies in 
leadership positions.
Under-reporting grain yields and investing in proﬁtable sidelines 
were common survival strategies after the Great Leap famine (Gao 
2006; Yang 1996). These practices were also likely to earn village lead-
ers popular support, while cadres who insisted on handing everything 
over to the state faced grumbling. Ironically, the Tianjin Daily article 
praised 'honest' Zhang Fengqin for saying, 'however much we harvest, 
that is what we will report', and chastised villagers who complained that 
Zhang's honesty put the village at a disadvantage. But it turned out that 
Zhang had been dishonest, to the advantage of her village. Xiyouying 
had kept 3,500 kilos of extra grain for itself. The village also invested in 
sidelines that reportedly earned 400,000 yuan in 'sudden huge proﬁts' 
(baoli) during the early 1960s, and even rented a long-term room at a 
Tianjin hotel in order to make business deals in the city (Zhonggong 
zhongyang dangxiao dangshi jiaoyan er shi 1987, Vol. 5: 488, 503). This 
was not the socialist system that Chen Boda wanted to build.
Later in March, Chen visited several other sites in Xiaozhan. He re-
turned to Tuozidi, where farmers had complained about labour model 
Jiang Deyu four years earlier. It was rainy, but Chen again insisted on 
walking into the village. He took off his shoes and socks, slipping and 
sliding through the mud. For lunch, villagers had prepared a substan-
tial meal with several dishes, steamed buns, and rice. When Chen saw 
the food, he shook his head and indicated that he would not eat it. He 
refused to 'eat big and drink big', one of the main crimes village ofﬁcials 
were accused of during the four cleanups. Chen said he would have 
a corn bun, and his village hosts rushed off to make some. Stomachs 
growling, none of Chen's entourage from Tianjin and the south suburbs 
dared to touch the food on the table. When the buns were ready, Chen 
divided one up and passed pieces around before taking two bites and 
declaring the meal ﬁnished. Chen then complained that even though 
Jiang Deyu had been cashiered in 1962, he was still in charge behind 
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the scenes in Tuozidi. Jiang would also have to become a struggle target 
during the four cleanups, Chen instructed (Liu 2000, 206-207).
Chen thought that he had found a good formula for getting close to 
the masses and discovering problems in the suburbs. This was a vari-
ation of the 'three togethers', the practice of eating, living, and work-
ing with poor peasants that all work teams were supposed to follow. 
Chen stayed in a colonial-style guesthouse in Tianjin's former British 
concession, where he enjoyed privately screened ﬁlms (including one 
about the life of Beethoven, Quan 1993: 83). He did not do farm work, 
but when he went to the countryside he followed a plan to make him-
self seem down-to-earth. First, walk into villages, even if your feet get 
muddy. Second, be seen eating simple food. Finally, be on the lookout 
for signs of excessive wealth. Chen had learned these lessons during his 
1960 visit to Xiaozhan, when he insisted on eating a meagre vegetable 
bun. In late 1964, he told a group of writers and editors preparing to 
join village work teams that his attention to appearances had paid off. 
'Recently I went back there and two peasants pointed at me from afar 
and said, "that old man wearing glasses came here in 1960 and ate a 
vegetable bun. Now he's back". All I did was eat once and the common 
people remembered it', Chen said proudly (Chen 1964: 40).    
After 1964, people in Xiaozhan would remember Chen's accusations 
during the four cleanups more than his bun chewing. After Tuozidi, 
Chen's next stop was Xiaozhan township, where he decided that town-
ship party secretary Zhang Yulun was actually a class enemy from 
a 'bandit family'. Chen had made his intentions clear. Over the next 
two months, work teams reinforced by new members transferred to 
suddenly important Xiaozhan compiled materials on three 'counter 
revolutionary cliques' centred around female labour model Zhang 
Fengqin, rice specialist Jiang Deyu, and township leader Zhang Yulun. 
Each clique included between 75-90 people, who were criticized at mass 
meetings. Anyone with ties to the counter revolutionaries also came un-
der suspicion: one ofﬁcial source reports that 2,711 people in the south 
suburbs were implicated in 'mistaken cases' during the four cleanups 
(Tianjin shi Jinnan qu difang zhi bianxiu weiyuanhui 1999: 425).
Xiaozhan's Shocks
Tianjin leaders helped to push the movement in a violent direction by 
endorsing Chen Boda's verdict on the cliques' three ringleaders. By the 
end of April 1964, Zhang Fengqin was kicked out of the party and her 
husband was arrested. Chen, who had ﬁnally got his way after being 
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ignored in previous years, remarked approvingly, 'the Tianjin party 
committee is not all that bad' (Tianjin shi Jinnan qu difang zhi bianxiu 
weiyuanhui 1999: 847). Jiang Deyu was detained in July; Zhang Yulun 
remained free until December, although his party membership and 
leadership positions had been removed earlier in 1964. Once the cliques 
had been identiﬁed and their leaders punished, people with connec-
tions to the 'counter revolutionaries' became fair game for inhumane 
treatment. 
Available accounts of the four cleanups identify work team mem-
bers as the main perpetrators of beatings and torture in Tianjin's south 
suburbs, although villagers were also involved. According to an ofﬁcial 
source, there were 29 'abnormal deaths' during Xiaozhan's four cleanups. 
One former member of a work team there told me that the dead included 
people who were beaten to death as well as suicide victims (Tianjin 
shi nongcun hezuo zhi fazhan shi bianji bangongshi 1989: 324).5 Chen 
Boda encouraged this violence after someone told him about a beating 
in Xiaozhan. 'The masses want to beat him, they have the revolutionary 
spirit', Chen said. 'First, they are not beating a good person. Second, 
they did not beat him to death' (Liu 2000: 230-31). Violence occurred 
on stage at meetings and also during interrogations. At one session, 
Zhang Fengqin was subjected to the 'swing the coal briquette' torture: 
one person grabbed her by the hair, another took her legs, and she was 
swung around violently. Her hair was torn from her head and two of her 
front teeth fell out (Liu 2000: 231). Zhang tried to hang herself at home, 
but two female work team members stationed in her house stopped 
her (Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao dangshi jiaoyan er shi 1987, Vol. 
5: 510; Zhonggong Tianjin shiwei bangongting 1964a: 50). Other rural 
ofﬁcials in the Tianjin region heard about the carnage in Xiaozhan and 
were terriﬁed when work teams arrived during a later phase of the four 
cleanups. In October 1965, work team members reported that 'because 
of Xiaozhan's shocks', cadres were afraid of getting killed: 'People say, 
"as long as I have a breath in my body after the movement is over, it 
will be okay"' (Jinjiao siqing jianbao, No. 1, 25 October 1965: 7).
Widespread fear was stoked when accusations about almost any 
perceived transgression—economic, political, or personal—led to hu-
miliation and violent punishment. Some of the harshest criticism and 
treatment were reserved for alleged sexual improprieties. In the ofﬁ-
cial report about the 'Xiaozhan experience' circulated nationwide and 
endorsed by party centre, both Zhang Fengqin and Zhang Yulun were 
singled out for having inappropriate sexual relations (Zhang Fengqin 
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with a Xiyouying vice brigade leader, Zhang Yulun with the 'concubine' 
of a 'landlord-capitalist'; Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao dangshi 
jiaoyan er shi 1987, Vol. 5: 511, 490). After the charges against the two 
village leaders were aired publicly, work team members investigated 
the sexual histories of lesser targets, sometimes viciously. When one 
female cadre in a village a mile away from Xiyouying denied charges 
that she had slept with the village party secretary, work team interroga-
tors stripped her naked and raped her with icicles torn from the eaves 
of her house (Liu 2000: 231). 
According to suburban leader Liu Jinfeng, he was the only ofﬁcial 
who tried to resist Chen Boda. When the Tianjin party committee ap-
proved Chen's suggestion that Zhang Fengqin be dismissed from all of 
her posts, Liu argued that she was a good cadre. At a work team meet-
ing in Xiyouying in April 1964, Liu departed from his script and said 
that Zhang would be 'temporarily' removed from her posts. Liu hoped 
that Chen Boda would research the situation further and realize that 
Zhang was a genuine revolutionary. He should have known better. Chen 
was listening carefully, and as soon as he heard the words 'temporarily 
remove from ofﬁce', he yelled, 'Liu Jinfeng, what the hell are you do-
ing? Dismissing means dismissing, why are you announcing that it is 
temporary'? Liu had no response. He turned his head and looked out 
the window (Liu 2000: 222-23). He may have been watching his politi-
cal career slip away. Chen Boda complained to Tianjin ofﬁcials that the 
'root' protecting the counter revolutionary cliques could be found in the 
party ofﬁce of the south suburbs. By the end of 1964, the south suburbs' 
party committee had been reorganized and Liu was transferred to the 
west suburbs as a low-ranking four cleanups work team member. When 
Liu went to Tianjin's ﬁrst secretary Wan Xiaotang to complain about his 
demotion, Wan said that there was nothing he could do: 'Party centre 
has already approved and circulated [Chen's] report, the Tianjin party 
committee has to carry it out' (Xie 2004: 20).
Chen Boda was able to have his way in Xiaozhan because Tianjin's 
leaders assumed that he was acting on Mao's behalf. After Mao said 
that revisionism had appeared in Xiaozhan, all subsequent reports had 
to conﬁrm this conclusion. In late July, Tianjin propaganda ofﬁcials 
Wang Kangzhi and Fang Ji went to Beijing to prepare the ﬁrst set of of-
ﬁcial materials sent to party centre about Xiaozhan: a chronology and 
a diagram outlining the counter revolutionary cliques' social networks. 
Chen was proud of the completed product. After work was done, he 
insisted on accompanying Wang and Fang back to Tianjin in his car. 
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Chen said, 'Some people say that scholars cannot do anything. I am a 
scholar, and Wang Kangzhi does the newspaper, so he is a scholar too. 
Fang Ji writes novels, he is even more of a scholar. Have we not done 
something big' (Tianjin shi Jinnan qu difang zhi bianxiu weiyuanhui 
1999: 847)? Chen forwarded the documents to party centre on August 
4, along with a letter stating, 'the chairman has instructed (zhuxi fenfu 
guo) that these materials can be circulated down to the county level 
for everyone's reference'. In case anyone doubted that Mao was back-
ing Chen's activities in Xiaozhan, here was the proof in writing. On 12 
August 1964, the chronology and diagram were sent to four cleanups 
work team directors nationwide. A more exhaustive written report about 
Xiaozhan was promised to be forthcoming (Xie 2004: 18). During the 
rest of August, Tianjin cadres hurried to prepare the document.
Lessons Learned, Lessons Ignored
Wang Hui, director of the Tianjin municipal party committee's general 
ofﬁce (shiwei bangongting), drafted the report, titled 'On the Struggle to 
Seize Power in the Xiaozhan Region'. Wang later regretted his involve-
ment. 'This was the most important document from Tianjin that party 
centre had circulated since liberation. It was also the document with the 
worst impact', he wrote (Wang 2004: 197). Wang Hui spent two weeks 
in Xiaozhan, mostly in Xiyouying, gathering materials for the report. 
Even though his ﬁnal report outlined the massive corruption, sexual 
misconduct, and evil deeds of 'class aliens' Zhang, Jiang, and Zhang, 
Wang Hui's impression of suburban village life differed from Chen 
Boda's. This is because Wang, unlike Chen, slept, ate, and went to the 
bathroom in Xiyouying for an extended period of time. Although 'the 
lives of the masses in the region were rather prosperous', as Wang noted 
in his fall 1964 report, he preferred the plumbing in his multi-storey city 
home. To Wang, Xiaozhan was better off than more isolated rural places, 
but it was still a far cry from urban life during the 1960s.
Wang Hui followed the three togethers in a peasant home, which 
meant that his daily diet consisted of onions mixed with shrimp paste. 
'There was not even a basic latrine pit in the yard', Wang wrote, 'so 
going to the bathroom was very difﬁcult'. In retrospect, Wang found 
it ironic that he and other work team members normally lived in nice 
buildings equipped with bathrooms, but were struggling against 
grassroots rural cadres living in mud huts. 'Their small-scale farming 
lives were extremely far from a capitalist restoration', he wrote (Wang 
2004: 206-7). Many work team members were like Wang. They fol-
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lowed orders to struggle against enemies in the countryside, but also 
privately took note of economic reality. 
By late 1964, even Chen Boda could no longer ignore rural economic 
realities. As the autumn harvest in Xiyouying came around, it became 
clear that the village's income had fallen drastically since the four 
cleanups had started and that peasants would receive less grain than 
they had under Zhang Fengqin's leadership. Unwilling to let his model 
ﬂounder, Chen went into damage control mode. The ﬁrst step was to 
invest funds in improving 'village appearance' (nongcun mianmao). Chen 
diverted 250,000 yuan for building projects in Xiaozhan, and asked Tian-
jin economic planners to consider moving city factories there (Tianjin 
shi nongcun hezuo zhi fazhan shi bianji bangongshi 1988b: 132; Li 1998: 
132). Even though village leaders' homes were too luxurious for Chen's 
tastes, apparently the area needed a makeover. It was standard practice 
for leaders to lavish state funds on model units—Wang Guangmei had 
spent even more in Taoyuan. However, architectural improvements 
would not solve the serious threat that a drop in local incomes posed 
to the credibility of Chen's model.
During the four cleanups in Xiyouying, the work team learned that 
Zhang Fengqin had kept 500 mu of 'black land' off the books (Zhong-
gong Tianjin shiwei bangongting 1964b: 83). Now that the land had been 
reported, Xiyouying was responsible for handing over more grain to 
the state. Also, following the four cleanups' attack on money making, 
the village's sideline income in 1964 plummeted by 44 percent (Tianjin 
shi Jinnan qu difang zhi bianxiu weiyuanhui 1999: 844). Chen Boda was 
learning an important lesson about how rural leaders had managed to 
keep life bearable for villagers. He was frustrated that villagers sup-
ported 'bad' cadres and hated 'good' ones. 'Bad cadres hid land and 
gave too much grain to the masses', he said in Tianjin in late November 
1964. 'With good cadres in charge, the hidden land is made public and 
the masses get less grain. This means that good cadres cannot continue 
on' (Zhonggong Tianjin shiwei bangongting 1964a: 53). Now Chen un-
derstood why Zhang Fengqin enjoyed popular support. 'Since the four 
cleanups movement, the burden on the masses has increased', he said. 
'If I were a common person in Xiyouying, I would also endorse Zhang 
Fengqin' (Zhonggong Tianjin shiwei bangongting 1964b: 83).  
It was unacceptable to Chen that Xiyouying owed more to the state 
after he had tried to clean up the village's problems. He ordered no 
requisitioning of grain from the 'black land' for at least three years.6 He 
also directed Tianjin ofﬁcials to immediately distribute to villagers 85,000 
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kilos of grain that had already been collected and warehoused. When 
Tianjin propagandist Fang Ji mentioned commune rules mandating 
that forms had to be ﬁlled out before grain could be given to villagers, 
cranky Chen went on a Mao-like tirade against bureaucracy:
'Why is the commune so bossy? This form, that form, burn them all! They 
have set up this complicated system that makes it impossible for us to get 
involved, then they can play tricks. Their crock of a system is hairsplitting 
and pretentious, they use it to frighten people. Why don't you take care of 
this! Your four cleanups work team is incompetent! This affects the masses' 
livelihood, it affects next year's production, but you do nothing about it! The 
commune is stirring up trouble by doing it this way! Let the masses discuss 
this and distribute grain however they want' (Zhonggong Tianjin shiwei 
bangongting 1964a: 54).
Fang Ji made sure that the grain was given out right away, and also 
carried out Chen's orders that ﬁnance authorities forgive outstanding 
debts owed by Xiyouying villagers. 
Chen Boda was discovering how difﬁcult it was to be a village leader. 
He bent the rules to maximize villagers' incomes, much like Zhang 
Fengqin had in previous years. Back in the village, Wang Fengchun 
had beneﬁted greatly from his rival Zhang's downfall. Wang, now 
Xiyouying's party secretary, owed his new position to Chen Boda. But 
Wang was unaware that his powerful patron had been pulling strings 
in Tianjin to distribute more grain to Xiyouying. Wang was still giving 
speeches attacking Zhang, saying that keeping more or less grain for 
the village was a struggle between two lines (more grain being capital-
ist, less being socialist). Now that Chen Boda was acting like Zhang 
Fengqin had, he needed Wang to shut up. 'His attitude and viewpoint 
are correct', Chen said about Wang, 'but in policy terms he is mistaken. 
Comrade Fang Ji, go back and do a bit of persuasion work on Wang 
Fengchun' (Zhonggong Tianjin shiwei bangongting 1964a: 53). As Chen 
Boda would soon ﬁnd out, Wang Fengchun was not the only person 
who had misread a patron's shifting intentions.
Chen's ability to manipulate events on the ground in the Tianjin sub-
urbs changed along with the overall direction of the four cleanups. Mao's 
late 1964 critique of Liu Shaoqi's version of the movement also applied 
to Xiaozhan. The 'twenty-three points', circulated on 18 January 1965, 
stressed uniting 95 percent of cadres and called for an end to 'human 
wave tactics', stating, 'we must not concentrate excessively large work 
teams within a single hsien [xian], commune, or brigade' (Baum 1975: 
119, 122). Chen Boda was chastened. Xiaozhan was a prime example 
of human wave tactics (more than 5,000 people served on work teams 
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there). And instead of uniting 95 percent of cadres, Chen had stated that 
'more than 80 percent of grassroots power' in Xiaozhan was 'not in our 
hands'. Work teams had taken Chen at his word (137 of the 191 cadres 
in Xiyouying, Tuozidi, and Xiaozhan township were labelled as class 
enemies within the revolutionary ranks; Liu 2000: 208, 212).
After making a few conciliatory moves in January 1965, including 
releasing Zhang Fengqin's husband from jail and allowing Zhang to 
labour under supervision at home, Chen backed off from Xiaozhan's 
four cleanups (Chen 1999: 58; Tianjin shi nongcun hezuo zhi fazhan 
shi bianji bangongshi 1988a: 196). The intensity of the movement di-
minished, and the last work teams left Xiaozhan in September 1965. 
This was small consolation to people classiﬁed as members of counter 
revolutionary cliques, including Jiang Deyu and Zhang Yulun, who 
remained in jail. More important, even though the twenty-three points 
had a temporarily moderating effect, the precedent for violence had 
been set by Xiaozhan.
Even after the circulation of the twenty-three points, there was con-
siderable variation at the local level as the four cleanups continued 
throughout 1965. While the worst was over in Xiaozhan and the general 
trend was toward moderation, violence erupted anew in certain areas. A 
rash of suicides swept through villages when a new wave of work teams 
entered Hebei villages in autumn 1965. In October alone, 36 suicides in the 
Tangshan region were attributed to the four cleanups. In the province as 
a whole, 533 people had killed themselves during the movement, includ-
ing 73 in the Tianjin region and 2 within the municipality (Hebei nongcun 
siqing jianxun, No. 40, 21 November 1965: 1-3). Even though internal 
reports urged caution and deplored the deaths, leaders like Gu Yunting 
(Tianjin's party secretary in charge of agriculture and the suburban four 
cleanups) emphasized the necessity of harsh struggle well into 1966. In 
a speech to work team political ofﬁcers, Gu spoke approvingly of the 
treatment used against Zhang Yulun in Xiaozhan, who 'was struggled 
against so hard that his sweat soaked the ground' (Hebei nongcun siqing 
jianxun, No. 98, 6 May 1966: 3-4). 
When Tianjin cadres returned to check up on Xiaozhan in spring 1966, 
they found that the problems they had tried to stamp out had already 
reappeared. New village cadres who had taken ofﬁce during the move-
ment were stepping down and refusing to work, and gambling and 
black market grain trades had become more common (in one village, 
40 percent of the population gambled, Hebei siqing tongxun, No. zengkan 
15, 20 April 1966: 26; Jinjiao siqing jianbao, No. zengkan 15, 12 May 1966: 
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4). Resentment simmered among those who had been targeted during 
the four cleanups. One former village party secretary became enraged 
when he ran into four cleanups activists at a public works site, yelling, 
'you fucking bastards, you relied on the inﬂuence of the movement to 
oppress people. Come on, let's go one-on-one, I'll get my knife and stab 
you' (Hebei siqing tongxun, No. zengkan 15, 20 April 1966: 25).
For a while, the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in mid-1966 and 
the power seizures that swept the nation in early 1967 gave hope to 
people in Xiaozhan who felt wronged by the four cleanups. They were 
spurred on by a group of more than twenty students from Beijing's Poli-
tics and Law Institute (Zhengfa xueyuan) who had come to dig up dirt on 
Chen Boda in December 1966. The students spoke with Zhang Fengqin 
and targeted her rival, Wang Fengchun. On January 22, 1967, a 'rebel' 
group allied with the students occupied the Xiaozhan broadcast station 
(Tianjin ribao, 18 August 1970). Chen Boda would later characterize this 
event as a 'capitalist restoration', explaining, 'cadres who were removed 
during the four cleanups came to power or were preparing to return to 
power. I heard that Xiaozhan was very chaotic for a while' (Zhongyang 
shouzhang jiejian Tianjin fu Jing daibiao jici tanhua huibian 1967, 10).7
Unfortunately for the rebels, they were attacking a project associated 
with Chen just as he was riding high as leader of the Central Cultural 
Revolution Group. Their cause was doomed. In 1966 and 1967, Chen Boda 
felt empowered to build upon what he had 'achieved' in Xiaozhan. In 
mid-1966, Chen told Zhang Chengxian, head of the work team at Beijing 
University (Beida), that he wanted to proceed at Beida 'according to the 
"Xiaozhan four cleanups experience" that he had created' (Zhang Cheng-
xian 1998: 28).8 Zhou Enlai also supported Chen, calling him an expert 
on Tianjin and Xiaozhan in April 1967 (Tianjin fu Jing daibiao 1967: 3). 
After Chen heard about what had happened in Xiaozhan, he told 
Tianjin's new top leader Xie Xuegong, 'there has been a reversal in 
Xiaozhan. Liu Jinfeng cannot be supported, Xiaozhan's four cleanups 
cannot be overturned, the facts are completely correct, and party centre 
knows all about it. In sum, Liu Jinfeng cannot be restored to the throne. 
Support Wang Chunfeng' (Gandaihui shirenwei xitong jiguan geming 
ganbu daibiaohui 1967: 2). After this utterance Liu and his wife (former 
chair of the suburban women's league) were incarcerated in 'cow sheds' 
and struggled against at mass meetings (Liu 2000: 228).
Those victimized during Xiaozhan's four cleanups would have to 
wait for relief until well after Chen Boda was purged in late 1970. In 
a strange episode about which little is known, Chen made a ﬁnal trip 
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to Xiaozhan in June 1970 in order to promote the slogan 'study heroic 
Xiyouying'. Beginning on 18 August 1970, just as the central commit-
tee plenum that would be Chen's downfall was getting underway in 
Lushan, Tianjin Daily published a week-long series of hagiographic 
articles about heroic Xiyouying. The ﬁrst of the articles celebrated the 
'great support' provided by a certain 'leading comrade from the prole-
tarian headquarters' during the four cleanups (Tianjin ribao, 18 August 
1970). Chen's name did not appear, but anybody reading the article 
knew it was referring to him. At this point in summer 1970, Chen clearly 
wanted to remind people that Xiaozhan was his rural model, and that 
it was thriving. But it was too late for Chen, who was condemned as 
'a traitor, spy, and a careerist' at the end of the year (MacFarquhar and 
Schoenhals 2006: 333).
Even though Chen had been viliﬁed and imprisoned, it took until 
1972 for Tianjin to send a team to Xiaozhan to reinvestigate the counter 
revolutionary cliques. In March 1973, the Tianjin party committee sent a 
report to party centre concluding that even though Zhang Fengqin and 
Zhang Yulun had committed serious mistakes, they were 'pretty good 
cadres', not black gang leaders, rich peasants, bandit family members, 
or class aliens. Both were rehabilitated, and Zhang Yulun was released 
from jail. Liu Jinfeng returned as party secretary of the south suburbs. 
Jiang Deyu was not so fortunate. For reasons that remain unclear, the 
report concluded that even though Jiang did not lead a 77 person clique, 
he was still a counter revolutionary and a landlord. His original verdict 
stood and he remained in jail until he was ﬁnally cleared in 1978. A 
second reinvestigation that began in 1978 ﬁnally cleared Jiang Deyu 
and others of any wrong doing (Tianjin shi Jinnan qu difang zhi bianxiu 
weiyuanhui 1999: 845-46).
Chen Boda was imprisoned until a year before his death in 1989, but 
he remained reluctant to admit that he had done anything wrong in 
Xiaozhan. At a mass denunciation meeting in the southern suburbs in 
April 1974, ofﬁcials excoriated Chen (in absentia) for having supposedly 
boasted, 'On the whole, I did a good thing for the people of Tianjin by 
carrying out the four cleanups for a year in Xiaozhan. If it were in the 
past, the common people of Tianjin would build a temple and erect a 
monument to me' (Zhonggong Tianjin shiwei pi-Lin zhengfeng ban-
gongshi 1974: 3).
Late in his life, Chen's brief comments about the four cleanups in an 
exculpatory biography compiled by his son were less celebratory about 
his impact in the Tianjin suburbs. But Chen still defended himself. He 
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remembered that when he read in the newspaper about Zhang Feng-
qin's rehabilitation, he had difﬁculty accepting that the four cleanups in 
Xiaozhan had been completely repudiated. What really disturbed Chen 
was that Zhang Fengqin and her husband were being compensated 
4,000 yuan by the collective for the money and property that had been 
seized from her in 1964. 'Both of them are villagers, both are "cadres", 
and neither worked. Where could they have got so much money'? Chen 
wondered. 'Just from this point, I think that the entire case was not nec-
essarily a complete mistake' (Chen 1999: 58; Chen 2005: 248).
Chen may have had a point—today, the party is still wrestling with 
the question of how to prevent ofﬁcials from enriching themselves at 
the public trough—but he was being disingenuous. He knew exactly 
how Zhang and her husband had made their money, and in 1964 he had 
already admitted that if he were a villager, he would have supported 
them. By the end of 1964, Chen was breaking the rules by handing out 
grain that should have gone to the state. In spite of his largesse, the 
people of Xiaozhan can be forgiven for not building a temple or monu-
ment to honour Chen and the work teams that did his bidding. Villagers 
were better served by Zhang Fengqin than by the disruptive presence 
of a central leader like Chen Boda. 
Jeremy Brown is Assistant Professor of History, Simon Fraser University 
(jeremy_brown@sfu.ca)
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NOTES
1 Chen was speaking to staff members of Red Flag and the Marxism-Leninism Research 
Academy who were preparing to join work teams in the four cleanups movement.
2  The full text of the directive and the accompanying report can be found in Zhong-
gong zhongyang dangxiao dangshi jiaoyan er shi 1987, Vol. 5: 482-518.
3  One source claims that when Mao criticized Liu Shaoqi in early January 1965, he 
said, 'Why did you need so many work teams? All Xiaozhan needed was one Chen 
Boda' (Chen Mingyang 2005). This was clearly a distortion of reality, but it reﬂected 
Mao's positive impression of Chen's handling of the four cleanups in Xiaozhan.
4  Wan Xiaotang died two and a half years later on September 19, 1966. Wan's cause 
of death is still in dispute: Red Guards claimed that he killed himself by overdosing 
on sleeping pills, while his allies said that he was in poor health and died of a heart 
attack. The massive crowds that attended Wan's funeral in Tianjin were criticized 
by central leaders as 'using the dead to oppress the living'.
5  Author interview, 3 Oct. 2005.
6  Chen Boda may have been following orders from Mao. On 15 December 1964, Mao 
told Liu Shaoqi that hidden land exposed during the four cleanups should not be 
taxed for ﬁve years. Pang and Jin 2003, Vol. 2: 1366. 
7  Chen was speaking on 18 Aug. 1967, in the Great Hall of the People.
8  I thank the journal's anonymous referee for alerting me to this reference. See also 
Walder 2006.
